Maurer School of Law: Indiana University

Digital Repository @ Maurer Law
Articles by Maurer Faculty

Faculty Scholarship

2008

Book Review. Einhorn, Robin L., American Taxation, American
Slavery
Ajay K. Mehrotra
Indiana University Maurer School of Law, amehrotr@indiana.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub
Part of the Political History Commons, Taxation-Federal Commons, and the United States History
Commons

Recommended Citation
Mehrotra, Ajay K., "Book Review. Einhorn, Robin L., American Taxation, American Slavery" (2008). Articles
by Maurer Faculty. 49.
https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub/49

This Book Review is brought to you for free and open
access by the Faculty Scholarship at Digital Repository @
Maurer Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles
by Maurer Faculty by an authorized administrator of
Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information,
please contact rvaughan@indiana.edu.

206

Law and History Review, Spring 2008

to M'Culloch's opponents. Second, the analysis of the congressional debates in
1811 (on the failure of the First Bank's charter) and 1816 (on the creation of the
Second Bank) adds important context to the much better known clash between
Hamilton and Jefferson over the First Bank's charter. Third, the book offers a
much-needed review of the oral arguments in the case, which lasted for nine days
and included such luminaries as Daniel Webster and Luther Martin. Since Marshall
issued his opinion just three days after these arguments ended, Killenbeck probably
gives them more attention than the Chief Justice did.
The book's chief weakness is that the author does not explain why M'Culloch
became a great case. This is particularly important because, as Killenbeck acknowledges towards the end, Jackson destroyed the Second Bank and his political
allies rejected Marshall's reasoning. In a few hurried pages, the last chapter argues
that the Legal Tender Cases, decided after the Civil War, "made it quite clear that
M'Culloch was the guiding spirit for what followed" and that "Jackson's efforts to
repudiate or minimize M'Culloch had failed" (179, 181). This is true to a certain
extent, but that begs the question of why M'Culloch is lionized while the Legal
Tender Cases are now neglected if they did the real work. Moreover, even after
the paper money cases were decided the Court did not adopt the broad reading
of M'Culloch that is now accepted as gospel. The missing link is the New Deal,
which needed to find precedents for its transformation of the federal role and found
one in a selective reading of Marshall's opinion. Rather than writing a ten-page
epilogue on James M'Culloch, the named party in the case who was a colorful
character but largely irrelevant, the author would have done better by exploring
the decision's canonical status in greater depth.
In sum, this is a fine work that brings every thread of M'Culloch v. Maryland
into a single volume. As an example of legal argument that combines politics,
structural analysis, precedent, and pragmatic considerations, the debate over the
Bank of the United States should be part of every constitutional law curriculum.
Gerard N. Magliocca
Indiana University-Indianapolis

Robin L. Einhorn, American Taxation, American Slavery, Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 2006. Pp. xii + 337. $35.00 (ISBN 0-226-19487-6).
"The anti-government rhetoric that continues to saturate our political life is rooted
in slavery rather than liberty," argues Robin Einhorn. "The American mistrust of
government is not part of our democratic heritage. It comes from slaveholding
elites who had no experience with democratic government where they lived and
knew only one thing about democracy: that it threatened slavery" (6-7). Einhorn
comes to this conclusion through a brilliant account of the historical links between
slavery, democracy, and taxation. Just as she used fiscal history in her fascinating
first book (Property Rules) to excavate the surprising political economy of midnineteenth-century Chicago, Einhorn has once again turned to taxation "to focus
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in on when, where, and with what kinds of results democratic governments existed
in the early United States"(8).
What she has uncovered is sure to spur new scholarly discussions about the
pervasiveness and implications of American slavery. Legal historians have long
recognized the influence of slavery. Yet, in employing a "neo-institutionalist" perspective, Einhorn goes deeper and further in illustrating just how slavery was
imbricated within the initial design, early development, and everyday operations of
American governance. Stretching from the colonial era to the Civil War, American
Taxation, American Slavery chronicles how the self-interest of Southern slaveholders determined colonial fiscal systems, the framing of the U.S. Constitution, and the
development of state constitutional limits on the taxing powers. With prodigious
research into primary and secondary sources, Einhorn's masterful narrative challenges the conventional Jeffersonian story about the Southern yeoman origins of
American liberty and anti-statism.
Einhorn's tale has three parts. She begins with a comparative analysis of colonial tax regimes in the North and South, using Massachusetts and Virginia as her
primary case studies. Whereas Massachusetts relied on its long tradition of selfgovernment and robust local democracy to levy a complex mix of sophisticatedly
administered poll and property taxes, Virginia and its oligarchic county courts
turned instead to an easily administered "tithable poll tax" that did little to challenge the slaveholding elites' "culture of sovereign mastership."(82). The fiscal
needs of the Revolutionary War exposed this stark sectional distinction, providing
further credence to Einhorn's claim that "tax structures were more sophisticated
in the colonies (and states) where local governments were more democratic and
where slavery was rare" (82).
Part II turns to national tax politics from the Revolutionary era to the early
1800s. Unlike previous accounts that have focused on the Founders' personalities
or the battles of contending ideologies, Einhorn explores the debates over taxation and representation to show how a country that was "half free and half slave"
struggled to finance wars, build a centralized nation-state, and imbue meaning into
ambiguous constitutional provisions. National political leaders found that nearly
any debate about taxation "hinged explicitly on the implications of the sectional
geography of American slavery" (115). Seeking to dodge the contentious issue of
how slavery ought to be treated for tax purposes, lawmakers drifted toward the
use of customs duties to finance the new nation. The national tax structure that
emerged in the early republic was thus a result of "decisions about how to avoid
talking about slavery" (111). Silence, Einhorn shows, can speak volumes.
The final section returns to the subnational story to explain sectional differences
and to analyze the novel development and anti-democratic consequences of state
constitutional "uniformity" clauses. Einhorn persuasively demonstrates how these
constitutional provisions originated in the early 1800s as part of a Southern political compromise between nonslaveholding yeoman clamoring for greater political
representation and slaveholding planters who sought "'security" for their peculiar
institution. Uniformity clauses ensured that newly "democratized legislatures taxed
slaves at the same rate as other forms of property-such as the land and livestock
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of the yeoman" (203-4). Gradually, these constitutional restrictions were adopted
by Midwest states as a means to distribute tax burdens more equitably.
But what began as a tool for tax fairness, Einhorn argues, was subsequently
transformed by "activist judges" into a shield for northern elites (245). By stringently interpreting uniformity clauses, courts prevented the aggressive assessment
of corporate property and consequently invalidated attempts at more direct and
progressive taxes. The framers of Midwest constitutions, Einhorn contends, failed
to realize the anti-majoritarian potential of these legal restraints. Thus a constitutional restriction intended to protect slavery morphed into a protection of elites'
property rights, at least until the early twentieth century when a new set of state
constitutional revisions "freed the legislatures from the stranglehold of the state
supreme courts" (248).
Some might disagree with Einhorn's characterization that Midwestern constitution writers "misunderstood" the implications of uniform taxation. As practical
policymakers, searching for ways to correct the fiscal failures of the moment, these
lawmakers were attempting to ensure that all citizens bore their fair share of the
tax burden. Their inability to achieve that goal over time may have as much to
do with unintended consequences as with their own misunderstandings about the
origins of the uniformity clauses.
American Taxation, American Slavery is a book that needs to be read by those
who continue to subscribe to the resilient Jeffersonian myth that liberty and democracy require weak government.
Ajay K. Mehrotra
Indiana University, Bloomington

H. Robert Baker, The Rescue of Joshua Glover: A Fugitive Slave, the Constitution, and the Coming of the Civil War, Athens: Ohio University Press, 2006.
Pp. 260. $38.95 (ISBN 0-8214-1690-1).
On the night of March 10, 1854, Joshua Glover, residing peacefully near Racine,
Wisconsin, was arrested by U.S. marshals pursuant to the Fugitive Slave Act of
1850, under a certificate granted to Benammi Garland of Missouri, his putative
owner. Glover was taken under cover of darkness to Milwaukee and detained in
the county jail. What set this case apart from all others was not that Glover was
quickly emancipated from federal custody by popular fiat and the breaking of a
door, nor that the leaders of the rescue were prosecuted and convicted. All this
had happened before. What set it apart was that the Wisconsin Supreme Court
intervened in the criminal proceedings against antislavery journalist Sherman M.
Booth and freed him by declaring the Fugitive Slave Act unconstitutional.
American antislavery had never lacked for distinguished legal theorists and tacticians, but H. Robert Baker persuasively suggests that to the better known names of
William Jay, Robert Rantoul, Jr., Lysander Spooner, and Salmon P. Chase should be
added the name of Byron Paine, attorney for Booth. Paine argued that the Fugitive
Slave Law, in denying the writ of habeas corpus and the right of trial by jury, abridged

